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INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 2016, police officers in Dallas, Texas killed a gunman
suspected of having just murdered five area police officers and wounded
several others.1 The use of lethal force to end the hours-long standoff
between police and the gunman appeared to be justified in the
circumstances.2 The heavily armed gunman barricaded himself in an
occupied college building, refused to surrender, and threatened to kill more
officers.3 He also claimed to have set bombs nearby.4 Considering the
heinous nature of the crimes that the gunman allegedly committed, the
incident would have been notable even if the police had used a firearm to
kill the gunman. But there were a few unique twists to the case. The police
did not shoot the suspect.5 Instead, they retrofitted a military robot to carry
a one-pound brick of C4, a plastic explosive.6 Officers operating the robot
sent it into the area to approach the barricaded suspect. Then, after
visualizing the scene through a video feed from the robot and confirming
that the robot was next to the suspect, an officer remotely detonated the
bomb. As expected, the suspected gunman was literally blown up.7 Many
commentators immediately thereafter concentrated on debating various
1

Regina F. Graham, Inside the Bullet-Riddled Community College Where Dallas Cop-Killer Micah
Johnson Died When a Police Robot Blew Him Up After He Murdered Five Officers, DAILY MAIL (July
20, 2016, 8:46 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3698498/Damage-shown-blast-stoppedpolice-killing-sniper.html [https://perma.cc/V4F3-JBWQ].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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legal and ethical issues concerning police using a robot to kill in a domestic
police situation.8 I seek here to address what should be at least an equally
pertinent question: is it constitutionally permissible for police to use a
bomb to slaughter a suspected felon?
Most of the reports about the legality and ethics of the Dallas scene
have not considered this question. The few that have cite legal experts as
being confident in their responses in the affirmative. More specifically, the
legal experts consistently assert that, as a matter of law, so long as a police
officer has a constitutional right to use lethal force on a dangerous felon,
then the means of that force is irrelevant.9 The esteemed Professor Eugene
Volokh agrees, commenting that the deadly force rule “applies just as much
to bomb robots as it does to guns.”10 Even a senior policy analyst with the
American Civil Liberties Union concurs, providing a succinct summary of
these legal experts’ common analysis: “As a legal matter, the choice of
weapon in a decision to use lethal force does not change the constitutional
calculus, which hinges on whether an individual poses an imminent threat
to others, and whether the use of lethal force is reasonable under the
circumstances.”11
This Essay challenges this depiction of the current state of
constitutional law. It reviews recent Supreme Court opinions on excessive
force cases and concludes that there is no generalized and singular lethal
8

See, e.g., Todd Feathers, Police: Robot Use in Dallas Justified, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE (July 17,
2016, 6:55 AM), http://www.sentinelandenterprise.com/news/ci_30136930/police-robot-use-dallasjustified [https://perma.cc/WDG4-2S7T] (raising concerns about whether robots might be asked to use
more force than a police officer would); Nadia Prupis, Legal Experts Raise Alarm over Shocking Use of
“Killer Robot” in Dallas, FINAL CALL (July 14, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.finalcall.com/
artman/publish/National_News_2/article_103216.shtml [https://perma.cc/2HXU-N89J] (arguing that
problems arise from the fact that police would be programming machines designed to minimize harm to
maximize harm instead); Hope Reese, Police Use Robot to Kill for First Time; AI Experts Say It’s No
Big Deal but Worry About Future, TECH REPUBLIC (July 14, 2016, 4:00 AM),
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/police-use-robot-to-kill-for-first-time-ai-experts-say-its-no-bigdeal-but-worry-about-future/ [https://perma.cc/5BVQ-K8QS] (discussing the potentially dangerous
implications behind autonomous weapons performing unexpected actions).
9
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Is It Proper for Cops to Use Killer Robots?, NEWSWEEK (July 15,
2016, 7:50 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/it-proper-cops-use-killer-robots-480482 [https://perma.cc/
7FUZ-4FCH] (asserting that guns and explosives are legally the same in police lethal force cases); Erik
Ortiz, Dallas Police Used Robot with Bomb to Kill Ambush Suspect: Mayor, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2016,
4:26 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dallas-police-ambush/dallas-police-used-robot-bombkill-ambush-suspect-mayor-n605896 [https://perma.cc/X9W3-83KL] (quoting Professor Seth
Stoughton as doubting that the “method of delivery” of death is legally relevant); Jeff John Roberts,
Why It’s Legal for Police to Kill with a Robot, FORTUNE (July 9, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/07/09/robot-bomb/ [https://perma.cc/X9W3-83KL] (quoting Professor Ryan
Calo as stating that the bomb raises no new legal issues).
10
Michael Nunez, Should Police Use Robots to Kill?, GIZMODO (July 8, 2016, 6:47 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/should-police-use-robots-to-kill-1783352496 [https://perma.cc/Z4U7-UN3T].
11
Id.
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force rule in constitutional doctrine. At one point in time, there may have
existed an affirmative, per se rule justifying lethal force.12 Nonetheless,
Supreme Court precedent squarely indicates that such a rule does not now
stand.13 All police use of force cases are subject to a reasonableness
balancing test. In addition, within that balancing test, the type and quantum
of force used are factors that remain relevant—even for cases involving
lethal force—when assessing whether an officer’s specific actions
constitute excessive force. In other words, American law does indeed
recognize the concept of excessive lethal force. Hence, I contend that an
officer’s use of a gun to shoot a suspect is not synonymous with blowing
up a suspect with a bomb.
This Essay is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of
Supreme Court excessive force jurisprudence and introduces the balancing
test. Part II argues that, under the balancing test, it is possible for police to
use unconstitutionally excessive lethal force. Part III discusses the likely
physical effects of explosives like those used in Dallas and argues that
police use of a bomb can constitute unconstitutional excessive force in
certain circumstances.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS REGARDING EXCESSIVE FORCE

The orienting constitutional provision used to judge whether police
used excessive force when seizing a person derives from the Fourth
Amendment.14 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”15 It is well settled that police action in apprehending
a suspected criminal by killing him qualifies as a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.16

12

See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam) (arguing that Garner’s statement
about the reasonableness of using deadly force on a sufficiently dangerous felon was too general a
comment to qualify as a clearly established rule); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–22
(2014) (citing Garner only to clarify that the Court considers a number of factors in cases involving
deadly force); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (“Garner did not establish a magical on/off
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”).
14
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16
Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. Interestingly, neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment provide protections in a scenario such as that in Dallas. The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause applies only to prisoners following an adjudication of guilt. See City of
Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
process protections, which contains a “shocks-the-conscience” test for claims involving seizures,
generally applies to pretrial detainees, such as those residing in jail. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 854 (1998). This leaves the Fourth Amendment as the sole relevant
constitutional standard for judging the actions taken by police when seizing suspects in the field.
13
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The primary standard for judging excessive force in Fourth
Amendment cases weighs the objective reasonableness of the officer’s
actions, considering the totality of the circumstances.17 The objective nature
of the test means that the acting officer’s “underlying intent or motivation”
is immaterial.18 The objective reasonableness test requires the court to
“balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests
alleged to justify the intrusion.”19
A few of the relevant factors commonly utilized in adjudging the
extent of the government’s interest in using force to seize a person include
the severity of the crime, whether the suspect is a threat to others, and
whether the suspect is physically resisting arrest or fleeing from police.20
Certainly, police may use greater force to seize suspects who pose a greater
threat to others or those who resist the police.21
Excessive force claims regarding nondeadly police actions to seize a
person have long been particularly concerned with the type and amount of
force used. Courts have devoted a substantial amount of time and text to
analyzing even minor instances of police use of force.22 A significant
number of legal opinions are devoted to judging specific forms of force,
such as the use of batons, handcuffs, hogties, or pepper spray.23 Other
opinions focus on what are sometimes perceived as more intermediate
forms of force, such as police dogs, tasers, beanbag projectiles, or carotid
chokeholds.24
Furthermore, judges often do not treat all instances of each of these
forms of force equally. For example, the use of a police baton may or may
not be justified based on how the baton is used and the degree to which a
suspect was cooperating with the police officer.25 Handcuffing a suspect
may be appropriate in many cases of legal arrests, but leaving handcuffs on
too tightly and for too long may become unreasonable.26 These sorts of

17

Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
19
Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
20
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
21
Id.
22
See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
§ 3.12[D] (4th ed. Supp. 2017) (describing how courts have ruled on varying degrees of severity of
police use of force).
23
Id. § 3.12[D][1][q].
24
Id. § 3.12[D][3].
25
Id. § 3.12[D][3][a] n.2542.1.4.
26
Id. § 3.12[D][3][e].
18
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judgments on the method and quantum of force for nonlethal force cases
are applied to all of the ways police physically seize suspects.
Legal commentators on the Dallas bombing who endorse the use of
any type of force once lethal force is justified would likely not doubt that
the form and magnitude of force remain relevant in judging the
permissibility of nonlethal force. The commentators seem to believe that
when lethal force is legally justified, some kind of on/off switch is
triggered,27 and once triggered, police may permissibly use any form of
force that may be at hand.
However, this view of the law no longer appears to be accurate—if it
ever was in the first instance. A focused review of the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s doctrine on Fourth Amendment excessive force cases
demonstrates that the means and magnitude of the lethal force used are
relevant to ascertaining whether it was excessive considering the
circumstances.
A.

Tennessee v. Garner

The notions that there is a single deadly force rule and that deadly
force comprises a monolithic category of force arguably derive some
validation from a Supreme Court opinion issued three decades ago. In
Tennessee v. Garner, the Court overturned the common law rule that it was
per se reasonable for police to use deadly force to stop all fleeing felons.28
The Garner Court specifically found that it constituted excessive force for
an officer to shoot a small-statured, fleeing burglary suspect in the back of
the head.29
Nonetheless, the Garner Court conjectured that it would be reasonable
to use deadly force to prevent an escape if “the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to
the officer or to others.”30 This latter statement is likely the basis for the
contention that Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes a single affirmative
rule triggering the rightful use of lethal force to seize a sufficiently
dangerous felon. Indeed, without further qualifiers, this language in Garner
might lead one to conclude that the form of deadly force is not an issue
because the statement generically refers to “deadly force.” In other parts of
the Garner opinion, the Court likewise seemed to treat death in a unitary
fashion. The opinion confirmed that the “intrusiveness of a seizure by

27
28
29
30
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Id. at 21.
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means of deadly force is unmatched.”31 Further, a “suspect’s fundamental
interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly
force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial
determination of guilt and punishment.”32
On the other hand, the Garner decision—and multiple Supreme Court
decisions that followed it—contain relevant standards and critical
observations that suggest that the law does not treat all forms of deadly
force equally. In fact, determining whether the lethal force employed in a
particular situation amounts to excessive force calls for a balancing test that
involves considering the form and quantum of the force used.
B.

Balancing Test

Since Garner, the Supreme Court has confirmed that all police use of
force cases, including those clearly involving lethal force, are subject to a
balancing test. In Plumhoff v. Rickard, a police officer fatally shot the
driver of a fleeing vehicle.33 The Court concluded that the force used was
reasonable under the circumstances, and cited Garner only to support
applying the balancing test to cases involving lethal force.34 In Tolan v.
Cotton, the police shot a resisting suspect, causing him life-altering
injuries.35 Like Plumhoff, the Tolan opinion mentioned Garner merely to
justify applying the balancing test.36 In City and County of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, the Court affirmed the reasonableness of an officer’s decision to
use “potentially deadly force” by shooting the suspect multiple times.37 The
Court again did not rely upon Garner in its decision on this issue, but
instead referred to discussions of the reasonableness test from Plumhoff.38
In light of the Court’s repeated insistence that the balancing test be
applied to all police use of force cases, the remark in Garner seeming to
issue a per se rule that it is reasonable to use lethal force to seize a
sufficiently dangerous felon now appears to be an anomaly. The Court has
cited the purported Garner lethal force “rule” merely one time since
Garner, and only in dicta.39 Rather, the Supreme Court has twice
specifically rejected the idea that Garner established any special doctrine

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 9.
Id.
134 S. Ct. 2012, 2018 (2014).
Id. at 2020–22.
134 S. Ct. 1861, 1864 (2014).
Id. at 1865–66.
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015).
Id.
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197–98 (2004) (per curiam).
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for deadly force. In Scott v. Harris, the majority reasoned that “Garner did
not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions
whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”40 Instead, the Scott
Court characterized the relevant comment in Garner as pontificating “about
the factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in that case.”41 The
Scott opinion went on to state that “[w]hether or not [the officer’s] actions
constituted application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether [his or
her] actions were reasonable.”42
Similarly, in Mullenix v. Luna, the Court confirmed that Garner’s
statement about the reasonableness of using deadly force on a sufficiently
dangerous felon was too general a comment to be applied to any specific
circumstances or to qualify as a clearly established rule.43 Considering the
Court’s various condemnations of any per se rule, there appears to no
longer be a viable argument that Garner established a particular rule for
deadly force cases that differs from the balancing test discussed above.
Consistent therewith, several lower courts, relying upon the Supreme
Court’s emphasis on applying the balancing test to all excessive force
cases, have expressly recognized that no distinct deadly force rule survived
Garner. These courts construe the Supreme Court rulings in Scott or
Plumhoff as signifying that there is no strict rule that differentiates lethal
from nonlethal force in excessive force cases. The single question is
whether the force was objectively reasonable in the situation.44 As an
example, a district court recently acknowledged that since the
reasonableness review is the same whether or not the force constitutes
deadly force, the question is whether the force used was excessive based on
the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene.45

40

550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).
Id. at 383.
42
Id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness test “‘is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application’ [and therefore]
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case” (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979))).
43
136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015).
44
Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that excessive force claims are
judged under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard); Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962,
968 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he touchstone of the reasonableness inquiry was not the subjective strength of
the officer’s belief, but its grounding in the objective facts.”); Peguero v. City of New York, No. 12CV-5184 (JPO), 2015 WL 1208353, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015) (discussing an analysis of the
totality of circumstances under an objective reasonable test); Stauffer v. Simpkins, No. 13-1094,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18751, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015) (explaining that a series of Supreme Court
cases show that an objective reasonableness test applies in cases involving deadly force).
45
Lively v. Theriot, No. 6:13-2756, 2015 WL 3952159, at *4 (W.D. La. June 29, 2015).
41
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In sum, the entrenchment of the balancing test and the Supreme
Court’s departure from any magical on/off switch specifically addressing
lethal force cases means that any supposed per se rule is obsolete. The
balancing test also means that there is no monolithic definition of deadly
force. If all types of lethal force were equal, then there would be no need to
consider the nature and quality of the intrusion.
II.

EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE

Assume for a moment both the existence of a per se rule and the
following factual circumstances: an officer uses deadly force to seize a
fleeing or fighting suspect who poses a threat to the officer or others. Does
that mean that there is no legal concept whereby the means or quantum of
force used could constitute excessive lethal force, and thus be unreasonable
and unconstitutional?
A district court recently discussed whether the means or quantum of
lethal force mattered.46 The Middle District of Tennessee asserted that
Plumhoff “rejected the argument that where deadly force is reasonable, a
police officer can still be liable for using too much deadly force.”47
According to the court, under Plumhoff, if an officer “was justified in using
deadly force, the sheer volume of bullets he used will not provide an
independent avenue to liability, no matter how excessive it may seem.”48
But this reading of Plumhoff is mistaken. The Supreme Court in
Plumhoff qualified the relevant statement as follows: “It stands to reason
that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a
severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the
threat has ended.”49 Importantly, the Plumhoff Court further commented
that the Fourth Amendment would have been violated if the officers “had
initiated a second round of shots after an initial round had clearly
incapacitated” the suspect or the suspect “had clearly given himself up.”50
Indeed, the Court in Plumhoff actually entertained the argument that,
even if deadly force was initially permissible, the officers still used too
much force. The Plumhoff opinion first concluded on the merits that it was
reasonable for the officer to shoot at the fleeing felon.51 Next, the opinion
considered the argument that “even if the use of deadly force was
46

Smith v. Cumberland County, No. 2:14-cv-00049, 2015 WL 7302513, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.
18, 2015).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) (emphasis added).
50
Id.
51
Id.
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permissible, [the officers] acted unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots.”52
The Court did not reject this claim out of hand, but analyzed whether the
police fired an inappropriate number of shots, i.e., whether they had used
excessive lethal force.53 The majority ruled that firing fifteen shots was not
unreasonable considering the suspect continued to attempt to flee
throughout the period the shots were fired.54 The Court likely would not
have entertained the argument about excessive deadly force, or would have
summarily dismissed it, if all forms and quanta of lethal force were legally
permissible once any use of lethal force was justified.
A.

Framing the Form and Quantum of Lethal Force

The Supreme Court in many cases has not treated deadly force as
some monolithic category. The Garner Court itself considered the form of
force used to be important. The Garner majority pointed out that “this
Court, by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, has
examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is
conducted.”55 Further, the Court noted that, because the balancing test
requires an analysis of the intrusion, “it is plain that reasonableness
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried
out.”56 The Garner opinion also cited precedent whereby “a particular sort
of search or seizure” had been found reasonable or not.57
Later Supreme Court opinions also focus on the form of force used. In
Scott, the Court held that the underlying reasonableness test, whether
applied to cases of deadly force or not, requires weighing “the use of a
particular type of force in a particular situation.”58 Notice the Court’s
concern in Garner and Scott, which both entailed police employing deadly
force, with the manner or type of seizure and how it was carried out. These
rather similar statements in Garner and Scott confirm that both the form
and quantum of force remains a relevant aspect of Fourth Amendment
excessive force analysis, regardless of whether or not the act amounted to
“lethal force.”
Indeed, in cases where the officer’s actions endanger human life, the
Supreme Court tends to frame the issue in a way that expressly chronicles
the form and amount of deadly force used. For example, in Brower v.
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
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Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (emphasis added).
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (emphasis added).
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County of Inyo, the Court addressed a scenario involving police chasing the
driver of a stolen car who led them on a high-speed chase at night.59 To
stop the fleeing driver, the officers in Brower set up a roadblock by parking
a tractor trailer across all lanes and behind a curb in the road, with the
truck’s lights turned off.60 In addition, they placed a patrol car next to the
parked truck with its headlights shining so that an oncoming driver would
be blinded and unable to see the truck in its path.61 The fleeing suspect
promptly rounded the bend at a fast pace, crashed into the truck, and died.62
The Court in Brower did not make any conclusions on the reasonableness
of this action (because the issue at hand was whether the roadblock
constituted a seizure).63 But the majority did comment that the manner in
which the police had set up the roadblock, particularly the risk and
likelihood of death to the suspect, would be relevant to the question of
reasonableness, which it left to the court of appeals on remand.64
In Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court indicated that the issue before it was
whether it was reasonable for an officer “to shoot a disturbed felon, set on
avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate
area [were] at risk from that flight.”65 Notice that, in this conceptualization,
the fact that the method of force—a gunshot—was expressly incorporated
into the specific question posed. In Scott, the Court framed the particular
issue as whether it was reasonable to “attempt to stop a fleeing motorist
from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s
car from behind.”66 Similarly, in Plumhoff, the Court framed the issue as
whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they “shot the
driver of a fleeing vehicle to put an end to a dangerous car chase.”67 Again,
in these latter two cases the Court fixated on the specific form and amount
of lethal force to end high-speed chases.
Hence, at least four times the Court carefully framed the balancing
inquiry as not about whether any affirmative lethal force rule was triggered.
Instead, it considered the particular form and amount of force used in light
of the circumstances surrounding the police’s interaction with the
dangerous suspects. Additionally, the Court indicated in Scott that Garner
could not provide a controlling precedent where the form of lethal force
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594, 598.
Id. at 599–600.
543 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2004).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2009).
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2016–17 (2014).
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was different. According to the Court, “Garner had nothing to do with one
car striking another or even with car chases in general . . . . A police car’s
bumping a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a
gun so as to hit a person.”68 The next Section provides additional support
underlying this Essay’s disagreement with any conceptualization of deadly
force as comprising some discrete classification.
B.

Intrusions upon Bodily Integrity

Courts regularly parse the means and quantum of police force used as
a constitutional matter. The Fourth Amendment requires it. The
Amendment protects one’s privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by governmental officials. Thus, when an officer’s action
involves an assault on a suspect’s body, the Supreme Court has recognized
that a factor in determining its reasonableness is “the extent of intrusion
upon the individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity.”69 This factor signifies again that all forms of lethal force are not
synonymous for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Court relied on this factor in Winston v. Lee to hold that forced
surgery to extract a bullet from the defendant’s chest to be used as evidence
constituted an unreasonably intrusive procedure.70 The Winston Court
distinguished a previous case that sanctioned a forced blood draw to test for
intoxicants based on its conclusion that surgically removing a bullet was far
more intrusive and medically risky than drawing blood.71
The following excerpt from a lower court’s discussion of the effect of
a taser is another example of the relevance of the physical consequences of
a particular form of force:
The incapacitating effects of tasers in dart mode entail unique intrusions into
one’s bodily integrity that increase with prolonged exposure. In addition to the
pain inflicted, tasers in dart mode result in total loss of control over one’s own
body, immobilization caused not by any external overpowering force, such as
a police control hold, but rather by a forced internal separation of the mind
and body.72

68

Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting Adams v. St. Lucie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F.2d. 1563, 1577
(11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson, J., dissenting), vacated, 982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993)).
69
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
70
Id. at 756, 766.
71
Id. at 761, 763–64.
72
De Contreras v. City of Rialto, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
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Lethal Force Is Not a Monolithic Category

Determining whether the specific police action constitutes lethal force
in the first place is likely a red herring. Definitional issues suggest that
courts should not focus on whether the force used was “deadly” force. The
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the term as it is used in Fourth
Amendment seizure law. Lower courts have tended to define deadly force
as an action that carries a “substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury.”73 Yet this definition is not helpful in many cases, as determining
the exact risk of injury resulting from police conduct is nearly impossible.
In the words of the Court in Scott, “there is no obvious way to quantify the
risks” created by an officer’s specific action.74
Furthermore, many courts have understandably been unwilling to
strictly classify particular types of weapons as always being deadly or not
deadly.75 The rationale tends to be that any of the tools typically employed
by police can in fact be used in a highly risky manner and that many types
of force may thus result in the suspect’s death.76 Even tools that were
specifically created to render nondeadly force (such as police dogs, tasers,
or projectile weapons) can be used in an unusual way to create a substantial
risk of serious injury or death.77 In contrast, those forms of force that are
designed to pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as firearms, do
not always result in serious injury or death. Recognizing these points, some
courts refer to methods as “more” or “less” lethal than others.78 The
Supreme Court in Scott, for instance, recognized that using a police car to
ram a fleeing motorist’s car off the road might “pose[] a high likelihood of
serious injury or death” to the motorist, “though not the near certainty of
death posed by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head.”79
73

Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2012).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007).
75
See, e.g., Blake v. City of New York, No. 05 Cv. 6652 (BSJ), 2007 WL 1975570 (S.D.N.Y. July
6, 2007) (indicating whether a police dog constituted deadly force depended on the factual
circumstances); Otero v. Wood, 316 F. Supp. 2d 612, 624 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (noting wooden baton
round firings could constitute lethal force depending on whether they were directly or indirectly aimed
at a person).
76
See Peabody v. Perry Twp., No 2:10-cv-1078, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46344, at *14 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 29, 2013) (discussing that a taser could create deadly force).
77
Thomson v. Salt Lake County, 584 F. 3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Hemet,
394 F.3d 689, 707 (9th Cir. 2005).
78
See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 311 (2015) (per curiam) (“The court also rejected the
notion that the deputy should have first tried less lethal methods, such as spike strips.”); Mercado v.
City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1160 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing a weapon as “‘less lethal’
munition”); Whitfield v. City of Newburgh, No. 08-CV-8516 (RKE), 2015 U.S. District LEXIS
169667, at *27–28 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015) (crediting police dogs and tasers with helping police avoid
“comparatively more lethal force”).
79
Scott, 550 U.S. at 384.
74

1179

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

In sum, labeling the level (e.g., nonlethal, intermediate, lethal) of force
used is not particularly useful. Rather, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurrence in Mullenix v. Luna, defining police use of force as lethal or
not should not be an orienting focus.80 Instead, the relevant question is
simply whether the officer’s actions were reasonable under the
circumstances, and that question is to be answered using the balancing
test.81 The balancing test is likely why the Court in Scott opined that other
factors might be relevant in weighing the reasonableness of the officer’s
actions in terms of the level of risk to the suspect. It conjectured that a
higher probability of a suspect’s death may be justifiable if, as in the
factual circumstances of Scott, a greater number of innocent lives were at
stake.82 This suggests there is no magical threshold in terms of the level of
risk for an action to constitute deadly force as a general rule, and that in
any case the threshold in terms of the likelihood of the risk in any particular
case may be on a sliding scale considering other foreseeable consequences.
The concept of excessive lethal force is not one drawn from whole
cloth. Excessive deadly force has been recognized in military situations.83
A political scientist speaking about killing in wars and times of civil unrest
coined the term “extra-lethal violence,” which she defines as “physical acts
committed face-to-face that transgress shared norms and beliefs about
appropriate treatment of the living as well as the dead.”84 This idea of extralethal violence can assuredly be applied to excessive force cases in a
domestic policing context. Fourth Amendment doctrine can act as a source
of societal norms and beliefs concerning a person’s justifiable interests in
his or her own privacy and bodily integrity.
Societal and judicial disapproval of police use of gratuitous violence
also supports the conclusion that police use of excessive lethal violence can
be unconstitutional. Judges have recognized that force that is unnecessary
and disproportionate may be excessive.85 This conclusion is in line with the
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purpose of the balancing test, as excessive force by definition cannot fulfill
any legitimate governmental interest.86
There is an additional ethical cliff. If the assertion was accurate that
all forms of lethal force are synonymous in domestic policing, then police
could use any instrument at their disposal or wreak needless havoc on a
suspect’s mind and body, regardless of how shocking or against popular
norms it may be. Could it really be deemed reasonable for police on the
streets to engage in gratuitously gory forms of killing, choose unnecessary
and disproportionately offensive methods, or use torture? Imagine law
enforcement officers on America’s streets using such primitive methods as
beheading, scalping, stoning, or lynching, or employing biological
weapons. The idea that some sort of lethal force trigger would
automatically permit any of those nefarious methods offers too much of a
slippery slope into even greater absurdity and carnage. Of relevance, too, is
that excessive lethal force cases involve violence perpetrated against
someone who has not been tried or convicted of any offense.
III.

BLAST INJURIES AND EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE

As of the time of this writing, Dallas officials had not yet revealed any
information about the condition of the suspect’s body after the explosion.
Still, officials have disclosed the amount and type of explosive material
used, described the site and the position of the suspect preceding the
detonation, and permitted news agencies to tour and photograph the scene
afterward (except for the suspect’s body).87 Together, this information can
be used to deduce the possible effects of the explosion on the suspected
gunman’s body.
Dallas police detonated a one-pound block of C4 next to the suspect,
who was at the time up against a wall in a confined area of a college
building.88 C4 is a common type of plastic explosive, typically used in
military settings or in terrorist activities.89 C4 is classified as a high-order
explosive, meaning that its initiation detonates into an explosive shock
wave with blast effects.90 To simplify, after a C4 explosion, positive blast
pressure occurs with expanding gases rolling out in a wave from the point
of detonation at an extreme velocity, creating a path of destruction along its
86
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way.91 The wave then inverts as a negative blast of suction in which a
vacuum of pressure forms toward the point of detonation.92
The effects of a high-order explosive device, such as C4, are
magnified in a confined environment. This means that in a closed space its
destructive impact multiplies beyond that directly caused by the explosive
on its own.93 Researchers in a controlled experiment set off a one-pound C4
explosive in a confined, ten by eight by eight foot rectangular steel
bunker.94 The size of the bomb and the area circumference in the
experimental design appear comparable to the device and enclosed space in
which the Dallas bombing occurred.95 The results of the experiment showed
that overpressurization effects after the initial detonation subsequently
caused an implosion in the center of the space, which then radiated a
secondary pressure wave outwards.96 The shockwaves then reflected off the
walls simultaneously and moved inwards then outwards repeatedly with
significant magnitudes of force.97
Overpressurization can propel nearby human bodies long distances.98
In confined spaces, the blast may slam bodies into walls, ceilings, or
floors.99 The force of a blast wave and its after effects can, depending on
the circumstances, cause multiple external and internal injuries.100 Bomb
blasts are relatively unique in their ability to impose catastrophic, multisystemic injuries simultaneously.101 “Blast injury” has been coined to
describe the unique “biophysical and pathophysiological” impacts upon a
91
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human body that occurs when exposed to blast effects.102 Common
consequences to a human near a detonation include traumatic brain injury,
blast lung injury, ear canal and eyeball rupture, bowel perforation, organ
laceration, acute renal failure, ruptured liver or spleen, testicular rupture,
blood hemorrhaging, fracture and traumatic amputation, burns, angina, and
sepsis.103
A blast wave can also discharge large objects which may crush a
person. Additionally, fragmentation causes objects within the path of
shockwaves to break apart and become projectiles that can penetrate a
body.104 These effects of blast injury tend to be amplified for bodies near
walls.105
It is very likely that the suspected gunman in Dallas sustained many of
the various types of blast injuries just mentioned. Photographs of the scene
after the bombing show significant structural damage to the building.106
Walls, ceilings, and doors were torn apart, glass was shattered, and other
visual evidence is consistent with a bomb having just exploded.107 This
visual evidence affirms that the suspect likely experienced many of the
catastrophic consequences of overpressurization and fragmentation
mentioned above. His body surely would have been pummeled internally
and externally both before and after death, likely repeatedly.
The primary purpose of this Essay is to challenge the legal assertion
made by several experts after the Dallas events that the form of lethal force
is irrelevant to its constitutionality. Assuming the veracity of the facts
released to date from police officials, it appears that it was objectively
reasonable for officers to believe that they faced a highly dangerous subject
who had committed heinous acts of violence. There are strong indications
that the officers had good reason to believe at that time that extreme force,
even that which posed a high degree of injury and death to the suspect, was
necessary to protect the safety of other officers and civilians.108 Thus, if a
police sniper had killed the armed suspect with a single bullet, it would
appear to have been objectively reasonable considering the totality of the
circumstances.
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Nonetheless, the form and amount of force the police used in Dallas
on July 7—exploding a pound of C4 in a confined space—are relevant to
whether the police acted reasonably. The blast likely resulted in extreme
intrusions upon the suspected gunman’s bodily integrity, both before and
after death.
If litigation were to arise, a court using a proper application of the
balancing test should consider the extent of the suspect’s likely pain and
the potential extent of the damage to the suspect’s body. Thus, information
on the possible consequences of the bomb on the suspect’s bodily integrity
should be relevant to determining the reasonableness of the police’s
decision to kill the suspect using a bomb.109
CONCLUSION
Police officials in Dallas on July 7, 2016, took a novel approach when
faced with an armed and dangerous suspect. Officers incapacitated him by
blowing him up with a significant amount of explosives. Legal experts and
the media have generally ignored the extraordinary form and extreme
magnitude of the lethal force used to kill the suspect. However, it should
not be presumed that the level of force used by the police was
constitutional just because the Dallas police probably could have killed the
suspect in some manner without violating the Constitution. Excessive force
cases, including those involving lethal force, are judged under the Fourth
Amendment using a balancing test that requires courts to consider the form
and quantum of the force used. It is at least arguable that the form and
quantum of force used in Dallas on July 7, 2016, was unreasonable in light
of the extreme injuries the blast could predictably have inflicted on the
suspect’s body in the location in which he was sequestered.
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